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Abstract 
The main focus of this paper is on the potential role that taxation and public expenditure 
policies play in general in affecting income distribution. We find that progressive personal 
income taxes and corporate income taxes reduce income inequality. The effect of corporate 
income taxes seems to be eroded away in open or globalized economies. We also generally find 
that general consumption taxes, excise taxes and customs duties have a negative impact on 
income distribution. On the expenditure side, we find that higher shares of GDP on social 
welfare, education, health and housing public expenditures have a positive impact on income 
distribution.  
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1. Introduction  
 
The last two decades have seen a general deterioration of income distribution in most countries 
around the world and even though the most recent data are not yet all available, all indications 
are that inequality has increased as a consequence of the 2008 world financial crisis and the 
following recession.
2
 And unlike earlier crises of a global scale, this most recent crisis may have 
a much more significant impact on the income distribution of OECD countries (Immervoll and 
Richardson, 2011). A variety of economic factors, such as increased globalization, corruption 
and other institutional failures, or demographic trends have been used to attempt to explain the 
forces driving larger inequalities in market incomes. The main focus of this paper is on the 
potential role that taxation and public expenditure policies play in general in affecting income 
distribution, positively or negatively, and to what extent changes in fiscal policies on the tax and 
expenditure sides of the budget around the world have contributed to slow down an ongoing 
deterioration of income distribution patterns- or alternatively, they have been conducive to such 
deterioration.  
 
Over the last several decades there have been changes in the rates and structure of tax systems, as 
well as, important variation in the level and composition of public expenditures in both 
developed and developing countries. Our current knowledge of how taxes, transfers and public 
expenditure programs may affect income distribution has significantly improved on a country by 
country basis because of all the research effort that has been put in the tax and expenditure 
incidence literature.
3
  Much less research has been conducted on how changes in taxation and 
public spending trends have actually impacted income distribution trends, especially in 
developing countries. However, some evidence indicates that fiscal policies do affect income 
distribution trends. For example, Caminada and Goudwaard (2001) found that in the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands, reductions in government spending in social programs making the 
welfare systems in those countries less generous have been accompanied by sharp increases in 
income inequality, although the causality has not been proven. Similar powerful effects have 
                                                          
2
 The evidence so far on the impact of the financial crisis on income distribution and the poor is reviewed in Cuesta 
and Martinez-Vazquez (2011).  
3
 See Martinez-Vazquez (2008) and Cuesta and Martinez-Vazquez (2011) and the references there for reviews of 
these literatures.  
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been attributed to fiscal policies in developing countries, such in the cases of Indonesia (Keuning 
and Thorbecke, 1989) or Latin America (Ocampo, 1998). On the other hand, some other authors 
have found a weak correlation between changes in government spending and income inequality 
(Schuknecht and Tanzi, 2005; Arjona, Ladaique and Pearson, 2001) or have claimed a general 
ineffectiveness of tax policy to affect income distribution (Harberger, 2006).  
 
Clearly, there is at this point a need to better understand what role tax and spending policies have 
been playing vis-à-vis the changing trends in income distribution. Does the degree of effective 
tax progressivity play a role in improving income distribution? Does an increased share of 
revenues from VAT worsen income distribution? Are recent trends in expenditure policies 
offsetting or reinforcing the effects of changes in taxation on income distribution? These are 
some of the questions we analyze in depth in this paper using a large panel data set of developed 
and developing countries covering the period 1970-2006. The challenges we face are significant; 
not only it is difficult to come up with good measures of changes in income distribution 
comparable across countries but also it becomes quite difficult to identify and measure the most 
salient aspects of tax and expenditure policies as they are expected to impact income distribution.  
 
Despite those difficulties, in our empirical analysis we find significant effects of both taxes and 
public spending on income distribution when they are considered jointly. These effects generally 
support the findings in individual country incidence analysis studies. Progressive income taxes, 
when considered separately, have a positive impact on income distribution, contributing to 
decreasing inequality, and this effect is more pronounced the higher the degree of progressivity 
and the higher the share of GDP that is collected with the individual income tax. Corporate 
income taxes also have a positive effect on income distribution but this effect seems to be eroded 
away in economies that are very opened or globalized, thus supporting Harberger’s (1998) 
reinterpretation of the incidence of the corporate tax in open as opposed to closed economies. We 
also generally find, in accordance with individual country incidence analysis studies, that general 
consumption taxes, excise taxes and customs duties have a negative impact on income 
distribution.  
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On the expenditure side, we find that higher shares of GDP on social welfare, education, health 
and housing public expenditures have a positive impact on income distribution, individually and 
collectively. In terms of the magnitude of the impact, the effects of taxes on income distribution 
changes tend to be of an equivalent scale to those for public expenditures. This is not necessarily 
consistent with the existing conventional wisdom of the higher ability of governments to pursue 
redistributional policies from the expenditure side of the budget as opposed to tax policy side. 
However, this is probably reflecting the fact that other public expenditures which are expected to 
affect positively income distribution are not included in the analysis mainly due to data 
limitation.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section two we take a preliminary look at the 
data looking at the trends in income distribution, taxes and selected public expenditures for our 
sample of 150 countries for 1970 to 2006. In section three we review the literature putting 
especial focus on regression based studies of the impact of fiscal policies on income distribution. 
In section four we develop our empirical approach, with the different specification models and a 
discussion of the several econometric challenges we face. In section five we discuss the data. In 
section six we discuss our empirical findings. Section seven concludes.  
 
 
2. Trends on income distribution and tax and expenditure policies  
 
The last three and an half decades have seen considerable variation in the levels of income 
distribution inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the 
average Gini coefficient for our entire sample of countries, which is calculated in three different 
forms: unweighted, weighted by country GDP, and weighted by country population.
4
  Although 
the evolution of the three indexes varies somewhat, especially in the most recent years, two clear 
trends are apparent in worldwide income inequality. From the earlier 1970s to the middle of the 
1980s income inequality decreased by all measures and at rapid pace. After stabilizing in the 
middle 1980s, inequality rose sharply especially in the early 1990s.  
                                                          
4
 There is no clear way to select the best representation of the trend but probably the population weighted index is 
the most attractive representation since inequality ultimately refers to people (Duncan and Sabirianova Peter, 2008). 
 The Impact of Tax and Expenditure Policies on Income Distribution 5 
 
 
 
 
Both unweighted and weighted by GDP, Ginis showed declines in the early 2000s although the 
population weighted Gini continued to increase. We would expect all inequality measures to 
show increases after the world financial crisis of 2008 but those data are not yet available for a 
large number of countries. 
 
 Figure 1. Trends in Income Inequality as Measured by Gini Coefficients, 1970-2006 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations; World Income Inequality Database V2.0c May 2008 
 
 
When looking at individual taxes, the overall personal income tax progressivity index
5
 has 
shown a pretty steady decreasing trend over the past 25 years (Figure 2).  
 
  
                                                          
5
 The personal income tax progressivity index is described further below in the data section. 
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Figure 2. Trends in Personal Income Tax Progressivity (unweighted Gini) and Income 
Inequality, 1980-2005 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations; Sabirianova Peter, Buttrick and Duncan, 2010; World Income Inequality 
Database V2.0c May 2008 
 
 
 
 
Thus, from just a general look at the data, there does not appear to be a major correlation with 
inequality and personal income tax progressivity. However, the trends for the different taxes 
measured as “collections as % of GDP” shown in Figure 3 indicate that is there is perhaps a 
closer general correlation between tax policy and the trend in income inequality.  
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 Figure 3. Trends in Taxation (as % of GDP raised with each tax) 1972-2009 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations; IMF GFS Database; OECD Revenue Statistics, CEPAL 
 
 
We can see there were significant increases in average tax collections worldwide in ‘social 
security contributions” plus payroll taxes and general consumption taxes (VAT), two taxes that 
are generally thought to be regressive, for over the 25 year period.
6
 The increases are specially 
pronounced since the late 1980s. In addition, also from the late 1980s we can observe a 
significant decrease in the importance of personal income tax, the tax that is generally accepted 
has the largest potential to redistribute income. Any impact of the decline in personal income 
taxes should have come to reinforce the impact of the general decline in the progressivity index 
we saw in Figure 2; that is, not only did the personal income tax become less important in terms 
of collections but also it became less progressive. For other taxes, we can also see in Figure 3 a 
long declining trend over the entire period, but especially so since the early 1990s in customs 
duties. This tax is generally thought as having a regressive incidence, so the smaller collections 
in customs duties should have helped reduce income inequality; but, we also must note that this 
tax is much smaller in terms of GDP than for example social security contributions or general 
                                                          
6
 The general incidence of taxes is described in the review of the literature below.  
0.00 
1.00 
2.00 
3.00 
4.00 
5.00 
6.00 
7.00 
1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 
PIT CIT SSC+Payroll GST Excises Customs 
8 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
 
 
consumption taxes. In the case of the corporate income tax, collections as a share of GDP have 
experienced a rollercoaster ride for the last 25 year, with an increasing swing since the early 
1990. This is a tax that is generally thought to be progressive, although less so, and can be even 
regressive the higher the degree of openness of the economy; also, this tax is of relative less 
importance in terms of collections. Last, excise taxes have also been on a bit of a rollercoaster 
and in the upswing since the early 1990s. Like in the case of general consumption taxes, excises 
are generally thought to have a regressive incidence.  However, their effect varies per country 
depending on whether or not they are applied to luxury or basic items for the population, and on 
the consumption preferences of citizens. 
 
As we discuss immediately below in the review of the literature, while taxes are generally 
thought to have a limited amount of power to impact income distribution, public expenditures are 
generally thought to have larger potential to affect it. In this paper, we particularly focus on four 
categories of public expenditures that have a priori significant potential on reducing inequality in 
the distribution of income: public expenditures on social protection, education, health, and 
housing, all expressed as “% of GDP.” The worldwide trends in these expenditure categories are 
shown in Figure 4.  
Figure 4. Trends in Public Spending (as % of GDP spent for each category), 1972-2009
 
Source: Authors’ calculations; IMF GFS Database, OECD Social Expenditure Database; International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) 
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The potentially redistributive expenditures on “social protection” have increased steadily since 
the early 1980s reaching a peak in the early 2000s and then declining slightly in the most recent 
years.  Public expenditures on health also have steadily increased since the 1980s reaching a 
plateau and then declining slightly in more recent years. On the other hand, public expenditures 
on education have decreased significantly since the end of the 1980s. Depending on the 
composition and access of lower income groups to education and health services (for example, 
primary health which tends to be progressive especially when there is access in poor rural areas 
versus tertiary hospital services which tends to be regressive) they can also significantly affect 
inequality in the distribution of income. Since expenditures on public health increased during the 
period, this should have contributed to decreasing inequality. And because public education 
expenditures decreased, this should have contributed to increasing income inequality.  However, 
the effect of both health and education expenditures on income distribution depend intrinsically 
on the intra-sectoral composition of spending in both sectors and the degree of access of the 
poorest segments of the population to the public services provided.  For example, it is expected 
that primary education benefits the poor provided they can access it and its quality is good, while 
tertiary education may benefit more the richer segments of society.  Similarly accessible primary 
medical care is expected to benefit the poor relatively more while advance medical care may 
often be affordable only to richer groups.  The fourth category of public expenditures on housing 
has steadily declined since the mid-1980s with potentially negative effect on income distribution. 
 
Clearly, the discussion above can only be taken as indicative and suggestive of the directions in 
which tax and public expenditure policies may be correlated with the trends on income 
inequality. The overall picture would seem to be that the worldwide trends in tax policy have not 
been conducive to reducing income inequality but, if anything, to increase it. Higher overall 
reliance on regressive indirect and payroll taxes and a reduced importance and degree of 
progressivity of personal income taxes tells the story. On the expenditure side, the decline in 
public housing expenditures but more importantly in education expenditures points toward a 
negative impact increasing income inequality, while the increased expenditures on social 
protection services and public health could have had offsetting effects, contributing to reducing 
inequality. Only careful econometric analysis can help us establish to what extent the increases 
in public expenditures on health and social protection may have offset those trends and overall 
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helped improve equality in the distribution of income. The econometric analysis is presented in 
section 4. 
 
 
Review of the literature  
Taxes and income distribution 
The interest in the impact of tax structure on income distribution dates back to Meltzer and 
Richard’s (1981) hypothesis that when mean income rises relative to the median income in the 
income distribution, a majority coalition of those with lower income will tend to support higher 
taxes, presumably more in the form of direct, and progressive, taxes as opposed to indirect 
taxes.
7
  There is a fairly large applied literature on tax incidence, allocating tax burdens among 
different income groups according to a conventional set of assumptions about tax shifting. These 
assumptions in the conventional tax incidence literature include the following: (i) the individual 
income tax is typically assumed to be progressive; (ii) payroll and social security taxes are 
typically assumed to be fully shifted to workers and regressive due to the cap on income to 
structure contributions; (iii) the corporate income tax is typically assumed to be paid by capital 
owners and therefore progressive , but less so in open economies where the tax gets shifted to 
immobile factors, mainly labor; (iv) taxes on goods and services, including several forms of sales 
taxes, value-added taxes, excises taxes, and also customs duties are practically all the time 
assumed to be shifted forward to consumers, i.e. they are assumed to be regressive, although the 
exemption and lower rates for basic commodities can reduce the regressivity of value added 
taxes and excise taxes on luxury items can be highly progressive.  
 
In his seminal paper on incidence of corporate income tax, Harberger (1962) shows that in a 
closed-economy with two perfectly competitive sectors and fully mobile factors of production, 
imposing a tax on capital in one sector would cause capital to move from the taxed to the 
untaxed sector, further causing reallocation of labor among two sectors and changes in factor and 
output prices. Using elasticities typical for the U.S. economy, Harberger finds that, in these 
circumstances, capital bears approximately the full burden of the corporate income tax. In his 
                                                          
7
 Borge and Rattso’s (2004) work for Norwegian local governments in 1996 supports the Meltzer–Richard 
hypothesis. 
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two more recent papers, Harberger (1995, 2006) revisits the incidence of CIT in an open 
economy where capital can flow freely across the international borders and finds that, in this 
case, the burden of a corporate tax is more than fully shifted to labor. To account for this 
dimension of CIT, we interact CIT variable with globalization index. Our results provide support 
for Harberger’s (1995, 2006) findings. In a closed economy, one percentage point increase in 
share of CIT to GDP reduces income inequality by 0.7 percentage points. However, the more 
open an economy is, the lower is this negative effect on income inequality – 10 points increase in 
the globalization index reduces negative effect of CIT on income inequality by 0.1 percentage 
points.  
 
Most of the empirical studies on tax incidence are country-specific studies relying on 
microsimulation models and computable general equilibrium models. The general conclusion 
reached in this literature is that the redistributive effects of taxes are weak, especially so for 
developing countries (Bird and Zolt, 2005; Harberger, 2006; and Martinez-Vazquez, 2008).  
However, some of these papers have found significant effects for large changes in tax structure. 
For example, for the United States, Li and Sarte (2004) find that the progressivity change 
associated with the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986 had a significant effect on income inequality 
decreasing the Gini coefficient in four percentage points. See also Gravelle (1992). 
 
There has been less empirical work on the impact of the tax structure on the distribution of 
income across countries. Weller (2007) uses cross-country data from 1981 to 2002 and finds 
positive effects of progressive taxation on income distribution. More recently, Duncan and 
Sabirianova Peter (2008) use a sophisticated measure of progressivity
8
 to examine whether 
inequality in the distribution of income is affected by their measure of structural progressivity of 
national income tax systems. Their main finding is that while progressivity reduces observed 
inequality in reported gross and net income, as measured by the Gini coefficients based on those 
data, it has a significantly smaller impact on “true inequality”, which they argue is approximated 
                                                          
8
 Their measure of progressivity for the individual income tax, which is also used in this paper, is fully developed in 
Sabirianova Peter et al. (2010). 
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by consumption-based measures of the Gini coefficient.
9
 However,  Duncan and Peter (2008) do 
not take into account the fact that the impact of progressivity on income distribution also 
depends on the relative importance in GDP of income tax revenues; highly progressive income 
taxes  but with relatively small collections is likely to have less of an impact on income 
distribution.  
 
Public spending and income distribution  
The oldest literature that ties public spending, growth and income distribution is on the Kuznet’s 
(1955) hypothesis on the existence of an inverted U-curve relationship between economic growth 
and the distribution of income, mainly stating that growth of national income is initially 
accompanied by increased inequality before the fruits of growth gets more equitably divided in 
society. However, the hypothesis is vague with respect to the duration of the period during which 
income distribution should become more skewed nor is explicit about any role that public 
spending may play in this process. The Kuznet’s hypothesis has been tested and researched for a 
good number of decades with, at best, mixed results.
10
  
 
More recent research on public expenditure and income distribution has been concerned with the 
effectiveness of government policy in improving or at least mitigating the worsening of income 
distribution. Independently of whether Kuznet’s hypothesis holds in its entirety or not, there has 
been an increasing consensus that economic growth per se may not be sufficient to reduce 
inequalities already present in the income distribution. As Tanzi and Chu (1992) have argued, 
without any redistributive government policy, even very large growth rates can fail to achieve 
any significant reduction in poverty rates and income inequality. 
 
Government policies, specifically expenditure policies, can bear heavily upon the qualitative 
results of economic growth. It has been also increasingly acknowledged that the nature of 
                                                          
9
 Due to the presence of tax evasion, Duncan and Peter (2008) argue that under some conditions tax progressivity 
may induce increased inequality in the distribution of actual income (as measured by consumption) as opposed to 
observed income.  
10
 Even though a good number of researchers have found that they cannot reject this hypothesis using cross-section 
data, others, starting with Clarke (1992) have argued that this hypothesis is basically of time-series nature and hence 
should not be tested with cross section data. In addition, some other authors, such as Bruno, Ravallion, and Squire 
(1998) and Anand and Kanbur (1993) have argued that with cross section data a careful monitoring of the measures 
of inequality across countries leads to the rejection of the Kuznet’s hypothesis. 
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economic growth can have discernible impacts in the distribution of income. In particular, 
contrary to the traditional economic argument that explicit redistributive policies can hamper 
economic efficiency and growth,
11
 it is now widely recognized that redistribution policies, such 
as in the form of human capital development amongst the poor, actually fosters growth.
12
  
 
However, there has been also wide acknowledgement, going as far as Tanzi (1974), that what in 
many instances would seemingly be perceived as redistributive government spending may do 
nothing to improve income inequality and may actually worsen it. This is due to the issue of the 
difficulty of targeting of distributional expenditure policies which has been discussed buy a 
number of authors (Aspe and Sigmund, 1984; Aspe, 1993; Birdsall and James, 1993; Gonzalez, 
1995; Harberger, 1998; Schwartz and Ter-Minassian, 2000). It is quite difficult to target the poor 
with regular education and health spending because, among other reasons, these programs are in 
many countries located in urban areas thus not directly benefiting the rural poor or even those in 
the informal settlements in urban areas. Beyond the inherent problems of designing effective 
redistributive public expenditure programs, other authors have emphasized the role of political 
economy, and in particular the political clout of certain groups, in effectively controlling the 
amount of redistribution that actually takes place in any country (Hausmann and Rigobon, 1993; 
Alesina, 1998).  
 
Of course, it is to be expected that the quality of targeting makes a big difference in the final 
outcome. In spite of the caveats above, many education and health spending programs have been 
found to be equalizing and ‘poverty reducing’ (Paternostro et al., 2007). Others have found that 
infrastructure spending in some developing countries has resulted in large poverty reduction (for 
                                                          
11
 The previous ‘traditional’ wisdom draws heavily from the Keynesian hypothesis about differences in the 
propensity to save, thus that higher income to the affluent implies higher savings and investment which leads to 
increases in economic growth; hence, the tradeoff between redistribution and the size of the pie in the macro sense. 
For example, most recently, Alfranca and Galindo (2003) found for 19 OECD countries that public expenditure 
positively affects growth and in addition that increased inequality in income distribution also has a positive impact 
on growth. 
12
 But it is also widely acknowledged that that there are instances of seemingly redistributive government spending 
which do nothing to improve income inequality, and may actually worsen it. For example, Gonzalez (1995) found in 
the cases of public education expenditures in Peru, such public ‘merit’ good spending was actually benefitting the 
non-poor and hence exacerbating the extant skewed distribution of income. The poor targeting of distributional 
expenditure policies is discussed by Harberger (1998).  
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example, Klump and Bonschab, 2004 in the case of Vietnam) but their effects on inequality are 
unknown.
13
  
 
In the recent literature much more emphasis has been placed on the relationships between growth 
and income distribution (Dollar and Kraay, 2000), and public spending and growth (Afonso, 
2005; Herrera, 2007; Moreno-Dodson, 2008; Bayraktar and Moreno-Dodson, 2010; Day, 2011). 
It is now quite clear that the quantity and quality of growth is affected by public expenditure, and 
growth in turn affects the distribution of income. Not only that, the nature of growth resulting 
from the public efforts is also affected by the existing income distribution (Alfranca and Galindo, 
2003).  
 
The actual research in to the direct relationship between public spending and income distribution 
continues to be much more concentrated on the impact or benefit analysis of particular types of 
government expenditure on particular income groups (like the poor) instead of the income 
distribution in general (Martinez-Vazquez, 2008). Nevertheless, there are a few studies that have 
focused on the wide impact on income distribution, either for a particular country or in cross 
country analyses. For example, de Mello and Tiongson (2006) in a cross-country analysis (the 
sample running from 27 to 56 countries depending on availability of data) of the impact of 
government spending on income distribution find the overall effects to be un-equalizing. In fact, 
those countries where redistribution is most needed due to high inequality, they are also less 
likely to have effective redistributive policies in place. In the case of country studies, for Brazil 
Clements (1997) similarly finds that government social expenditures have contributed to 
exacerbate income inequalities. On the contrary, Jao (2000) finds that in the case of Taiwan 
public expenditures on social assistance and social insurance contributed positively in reducing 
income inequality.   However, a number of developing countries worldwide have implemented 
conditional cash transfers systems that link spending to actual use of the public service being 
provided, leading to better impact of government social spending on the poor
14
.  
 
                                                          
13
 But here again the rent seeking behavior of the elite can change the outcomes, as identified by Araujo (2008) for 
Ecuador and Khemani (2010 for India. 
14
 See for example Bolsa Familia in Brazil and Progresa in Mexico.  
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In a recent paper, Boustan et al. (2010) looked at the relationship between government spending 
and income inequality from exactly the opposite angle. For counties and municipalities in the 
United States (for 1970-2000) they analyzed the effect of inequality on public spending. They 
find that as inequality rises (across time and across regions) public spending rises as well.
15
 
However, those increased expenditures are mainly over police, fire protection, road maintenance, 
but also schools, while financing has continued to shift from property taxes to other sales and 
other more regressive taxes. Thus Boustan et al., (2010) conclude that although inequality results 
in higher spending, tax financing and spending programs as a whole do not contribute to 
improving income distribution, which fits well into the evidence of a widening income gap in the 
USA (Smeeding, 2004; Caminada and Goudswaard, 2001).
16
 
 
In summary, the literature has focused on the relationships between growth and income 
distribution, and between public spending and growth. On the relationship between public 
spending and income distribution, considerable research efforts have mainly concentrated on the 
impact of particular types of spending on different income classes. Much less research effort has 
gone into analyzing the effect of the variability of public spending composition on the 
distribution of income as a whole. No doubt this latter type of research has been hampered by the 
unavailability of uniform data across countries not only for income distribution itself but also for 
public spending. Overall, it would seem fair to conclude that the evidence so far suggests that 
properly targeted public expenditure in social welfare and in human capital formation, such as 
health and education, has the potential to affect income distribution positively especially when 
effectively targeted, which unfortunately is proving hard to design and implement. 
  
  
                                                          
15
 According to their estimates, “average increase in the city-level Gini Coefficient over this period (5 points) leads 
to a $63 increase in expenditures per resident”. 
16
 For individual country studies on the impact of taxes and transfers on income distribution recent papers include 
Riihelä et al. (2008) for Finland and Glennerster (2006) and Adam and Browne (2010) for the United Kingdom. In 
terms of cross-country studies, there are a number of papers that have investigated specific government policies, 
such as the impact of social transfers in the EU by Heady et al. (2001). Other studies have focused on the 
progressivity of the personal income tax (Peter et al., 2009; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2001, Wagstaff et al., 
1999). For previous multi-country comparative study see also Immervoll et al. (2006).  
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The interaction of taxes and public spending and income distribution  
There has been less research looking at the combined effects of taxes and public expenditures on 
income distribution. In a recent study for Brazil, Baer and Galvao (2008) found that when the tax 
and expenditure system are considered together, the system tends to favor the higher income 
classes. Also, Immervoll and Richardson (2011) recently studied the impact of tax-benefit 
systems in OECD countries over the last two decades. They focus on inequality trends among 
‘non-elderly” households and on the role played by the personal income tax and social security 
taxes paid by employees on the one hand, and cash transfers received, such as unemployment 
benefits etc, on the other hand. They conclude that even though tax-benefit systems have become 
more redistributive since the 1980s, that trend has not been large enough to offset the increasing 
trend in market- income inequality which grew by twice as much as redistribution. In addition, 
the redistributive strenght of tax-benefit systesm weakned in many OECD countries beween the 
mid 199os and the mid 2000s. They also conclude that in terms of redistribution strength, direct 
“benefits” had a much stronger impact on redistribution than personal income taxes and social 
security contributions, despite the much larger relative size of these taxes in GDP vis-à-vis direct 
benefits paid. Because of this composition of redistributive tools, redistributive policies in OECD 
countries have been more effective in closing income gaps at the botom of the income 
distribution than at the top. In restoring incomes at the bottom of income distribution the most 
effective policy is to encourage employemnt and earnings growth amongs these groups.  
 
 
4. Empirical Estimation Approach 
 
This section discusses the methodology we apply to test the relationship between tax system and 
expenditure structure, and income inequality.  We use a multivariate regression framework to 
analyze the impact of personal income tax, other taxes, and public expenditures on income 
distribution. This is a departure from most previous studies, that as we saw in the review of the 
literature above, use microsimulation techniques to estimate that impact in a country specific 
context. From the outset we need to be aware that this approach also has limitations. For one, we 
are limited in the full recognition of within country heterogeneity regarding policy instruments in 
the tax and expenditure sides, behavioral responses by households and so on. However we are 
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able to account for the impact of most taxes and spending patterns on a large international scale 
with cross-country comparisons and the evolution overtime of within-country variations in 
policies and changes in income distribution.  
 
Income inequality is measured here by the Gini coefficient, although of course inequality has 
many other dimensions. 
17
 The term “redistribution” is used to mean a reduction in income 
inequality as measured by the Gini coefficients as the result of government policies controlling 
for other factors that typically have been identified in the past literature as significant 
determinants of income distribution. On the side of government policies we consider all direct 
and indirect taxes, 
18
 as well as a variety of government expenditures beyond social welfare 
expenditures.
19
 We take a long run view of how tax and expenditure policies may have affected 
income distribution over a continuum of 30 + years. . Using a multi-country study can be 
criticized because even though income distribution is affected by a set of common factors across 
countries, there are many institutions and processes that are particular to each country that cannot 
be reflected in the variables used in the regression. However, this issue is minimized because in 
our estimation technique we control for those fixed country effects.  
 
We consider first the tax side alone; the expenditure side alone, and both sides tax and 
expenditure, and compare how this affects the estimated coefficients. The impact of changes in 
taxes on income distribution is captured using ratios to GDP.  The larger the share of any 
particular taxes on GDP, the larger the potential impact (positive or negative) on income 
distribution.  
 
  
                                                          
17
 We do not take into account other dimensions of inequality broadly defined which are not measured by income. 
18
 Most studies in contrast have focused on the impact of individual income and social security taxes paid by 
employees. The rationale to control for the impact of other taxes is that each of them has a different final economic 
incidence which is expected to affect the final distribution of income. Thus for example, the burden of portion of 
social security taxes formally paid by employers is widely accepted falls on employees.  Sometimes it is argued that 
consumption taxes are excluded from the analysis because they do not have a direct impact of income. However 
they do have a direct impact on the level of consumption and our measures of Gini also include Gini measured based 
on consumption. The inclusion of corporate income taxes is also justified because the final incidence of corporate 
income tax may be in lowered wages and labor income depending on the final economic incidence of the CIT.  
19
 For example, public expenditures on health and education have the potential of increasing human capital of lower 
income groups and therefore reduce income inequality. 
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The model 
In investigating the impact of tax and expenditure policies on income inequality, we focus on the 
evolution of the Gini coefficient, which is computed on the basis of income distributions using 
different concepts of income, including gross income, net income and consumption. This 
presents some measurement and comparability issues that we can only partially address below.  
We are interested in finding out how the tax structure and its progressivity, as well as public 
spending and a set of other control explanatory variables, have affected the Gini coefficient over 
time in our sample of countries. 
 
It is almost certain that income inequality in a current year depends on its level(s) in previous 
year(s) and a set of variables that is commonly used in the literature to explain income inequality 
(see Milanovic, 2006; De Gregorio and Lee, 2002; Gupta, Davoodi, & Alonso-Terme, 2002). 
Starting from this assumption, we test the overall hypothesis that both tax and expenditure 
structures are important determinants of income inequality. Therefore, the model to be estimated 
has the following form: 
 
                                                                                     
 
In equation   ,        represents the gini coefficient in country   in year  ,             , 
while          represents its value in year    . Next,     stands for a vector of fiscal variables 
representing tax instruments and public expenditures in country   in year  . The variables 
representing tax instruments are personal income tax (PIT), corporate income tax (CIT), social 
security contributions (SSC) and payroll taxes, general sales tax (GST), excises, and customs 
duties. On the expenditure side we focus on four types of public expenditures that we can 
anticipate can have significant differential impacts on income distribution; namely, expenditures 
for social protection, for education, for health, and for housing. The vector     represents the set 
of control variables that have been consistently found to play a significant role in explaining 
income inequality in the previous literature. These include population growth, age dependency, 
the level of globalization, GDP per capita growth, unemployment, the extent of corruption, 
education level, and the size of government. Finally, in the error term,    stands for unobserved 
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country fixed effects. Further discussion of all the variables of interest and control variables is 
provided below in this section. 
  
We need to address several econometric problems that may arise in the estimation of equation 
(1). First, the variables representing tax instruments and public expenditures in     are likely to 
be endogenous, due to reverse causality– from income inequality to chosen fiscal policy 
instruments and vice versa. In particular, countries with higher income inequality may choose to 
rely relatively more on direct taxation and/or public expenditures, and vice versa. As a result, 
these regressors may be correlated with the error term. This reverse causality between inequality 
and progressive measures largely based on the median voter model goes back to Meltzer and 
Richard (1981) and it has been further developed by Persson and Tabellini (1999) and others. It 
is hypothesized that as income distribution becomes more unequal and skewed, lowering the 
ratio of median to mean income, a majority of voters in a coalition with the median voter is more 
likely to vote for higher taxes and greater levels of redistribution. Besides this argument for 
potential reverse causality, endogeneity may also arise due to omitted variables and measurement 
error.
20
  
 
Time-invariant unobserved country fixed effects may be correlated with the explanatory 
variables. The fixed effects are contained in the error term     in equation (1), which consists of 
the unobserved country-specific effects,   , and the observation-specific errors,    ,        
   .  
 
Third, the presence of the lagged dependent variable          is likely to give rise to 
autocorrelation. Finally, the panel dataset has a relatively short time dimension (T =30) and 
relatively larger country dimension (N=150). This causes a potential problem because when the 
time period is short, the correlation of the lagged dependent variable with the error term, and 
hence the dynamic panel bias, may be significant. In this case, applying a straightforward fixed 
effects estimator would not be appropriate (Roodman, 2006).  
 
                                                          
20
 If the time invariant country characteristics are correlated with the error term, these omitted variables can create 
an endogeneity bias. The measurement error bias is due to the fact that the progressivity index is after all itself an 
estimated parameter with large or smaller standard errors. See Duncan and Sabirianova Peter (2008).  
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To address the endogeneity problem, one would usually choose an instrumental variables 
approach. However, finding good instruments for all observed types of taxation and public 
expenditures is a significant challenge. For example Duncan and Sabirianova Peter (2008) 
address the endogeneity of their progressivity measure by using an instrumental variable 
corresponding to the progressivity measures from neighboring countries weighted by distance 
and population.
21
 Using OLS is likely to yield biased and inconsistent estimated coefficients 
given the presence of heterogeneity among countries. However, using a fixed effects estimation 
to account for that heterogeneity is questionable given the small variation in the Gini coefficients 
(the dependent variable) for a significant part of the sample. To address the second, third and 
fourth potential problems, we use the GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991), which was 
first proposed by (Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen, 1988). The difference GMM estimator uses 
first differences to transform equation (1) into  
 
                                                                                                   
 
Because fixed country-specific effects do not vary over time, they disappear by this 
transformation, solving problem (2). That is,   
   
                                                                                                                                            
or 
                                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                                  
 
The autocorrelation problem is addressed by “instrumenting” the first-differenced lagged 
dependent variable with its past levels. Also note that the Arellano – Bond estimator is designed 
for small-T large-N panels. In large-T panels, a shock to the country-specific fixed effect, which 
appears in the error term, declines with time. Similarly, the correlation of the lagged dependent 
variable with the error term is insignificant (Roodman, 2006). On the other hand, if N is small, 
                                                          
21
 The basic assumption is that tax progressivity in a country does not have an independent effect on the distribution 
of income in the neighboring countries, so the instrumental variable is expected to be uncorrelated with the error 
term in the regression explaining inequality in the original country.  
 The Impact of Tax and Expenditure Policies on Income Distribution 21 
 
 
 
the cluster-robust standard errors and the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test may be unreliable. 
In these cases, using the Arellano – Bond estimator would not be necessary. 
 
5. Variables and data  
  
This study uses an unbalanced panel data on 150 developed, developing and transition countries, 
between 1970 and 2009. The dependent variable, income inequality, is measured by the Gini 
coefficient. Given low data coverage for Gini coefficients and also, the more surprising, scarcity 
of data on tax collections and especially public expenditures, the actual number of observations 
used in each regression is often significantly reduced. 
 
Measuring income inequality  
The consumption based Gini coefficients have the advantage that they can be interpreted as 
being a better approximation of permanent income (Duncan and Sabirianova Peter, 2008). 
Beyond the limitation of measuring inequality in the distribution of income with the Gini 
coefficient, we also need to acknowledge that in the presence of considerable tax evasion due to 
informality and unreported income, the changes in observed income are not be necessary the 
same as those in true income (a point developed also in Duncan and Sabirianova Peter, 2008).  
 
From the theory and practice of tax incidence we anticipate that progressive personal income 
taxes should contribute to a more equal distribution of income the more so the larger the PIT 
revenue collections are as a share of GDP and the higher the progressivity of the PIT. In 
particular, progressivity is measured as average rate progression up to an income level equivalent 
to y (where y is a country’s per capita GDP), which is a measure of PIT progressivity developed 
by Peter, Buttrick, and Duncan (2010). On their formal structure, personal income taxes over the 
past three decades have experienced a reduction in the number of tax rate brackets, maximum 
statutory rates and also complexity. These trends are highlighted by the large number of 
countries that have adopted flat rate PITs, especially in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet 
Union countries. 
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Measuring income tax progressivity  
Here we will use the measure of progressivity developed by Sabirianova Peter et al. (2010). As 
these authors point out, progressivity has been measured in the literature by either identifying  
the top statutory rate in the personal income tax schedule which has obvious limitations given the 
complexity of most personal income taxes, or in the form of  an effective inequality-based index 
which requires before and after taxation measures of income distribution, or structural 
progressivity measures which capture changes in in average and marginal rates along the income 
distribution which do not require information on after-tax outcomes in income distribution 
(Musgrave and Thin, 1948). This latter is the approach followed by Sabirianova Peter et al. 
(2010). They produce a single, comprehensive measure of PIT progressivity by first deriving 
average and marginal tax rates along the income distribution (using the country’s GDP per capita 
and its multiples as a comparable income base) and then applying the tax schedule and structure 
information (standard deductions, personal allowances, tax credits, and so on) to arrive at the 
taxes due and the marginal and average effective tax rates.  
 
Variables of Interest: Taxes and Public Expenditures 
As this study investigates the effect of government tax and expenditure policy on income 
inequality, our variables of interest are individual tax instruments and certain types of public 
expenditures. We discuss first the separate tax instruments. Here, our ex ante expectations of the 
impact of each tax on income inequality is based on what is generally accepted in the tax 
incidence literature (Martinez—Vazquez, 2008).  
 
Personal income taxes generally are assumed to be progressive, contributing to lower income 
inequality. However, not all personal income taxes are created equal in terms of their structure 
and resulting overall level of progressivity, thus to identify the impact of the PIT on income 
inequality it becomes very important to observe its level of progressivity. For that reason, we 
interact the personal income tax variable with a personal income tax progressivity measure 
derived by Peter, Buttrick and Duncan (2010).  
 
In the case of corporate income taxes, the conventional wisdom on its incidence is much more 
controversial. To the extent that the tax falls on capital income recipients, the CIT is a 
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progressive tax. However, with high capital mobility and globalization, a higher share of its tax 
burden will tend to fall on internationally less mobile factors of production, namely labor. To 
allow for this difference in final incidence, the CIT variable is interacted with an index of 
globalization for each country, which is discussed further below. The more open the economy 
the higher share of the CIT that would fall on labor income making this tax less progressive.  
 
While PIT can be progressive, social security contributions and payroll taxes can be regressive, 
i.e. representing a larger part of pretax income for low income workers. Social security 
contributions and payroll taxes are commonly shared between employees and employers. 
However, it is commonly accepted in tax incidence theory that employers tend to almost entirely 
shift the burden to employees in form of lower wages. And unlike the case of the PIT and CIT, 
social security contributions and payroll taxes are generally thought as not being progressive and 
possibly regressive because in most cases contributions are capped with income, so the overall 
burden or average rate tends to decreases with income.    
 
As indirect taxes are ultimately paid by consumers, and lower income groups spend a higher 
share of their incomes, relatively higher reliance on general sales taxes, excises and/or customs 
duties is generally expected to result in higher real income inequality. However, the most 
important of indirect tax sources, the general consumption tax or value-added tax (VAT) can be 
designed with some features (exemption of basic commodities, lower rates, and so on) that can 
significantly mitigate the regressivity of this tax. To allow for differences on the impact of the 
VAT and other indirect taxes on inequality we introduce each of these taxes separately in the 
regressions. We must note also that among excise taxes, there are some that can be highly 
regressive (e.g., a tax on kerosene fuel, used mostly by poor households in developing countries) 
or quite progressive (e.g., surtaxes on some luxury items mostly consumed by high income 
households). Unfortunately the data we have does not allow us to differentiate among the 
different excises.    
 
On the public expenditure side, we focus on four important types of public expenditures (by 
functional classification) which can be expected to have a significant impact on reducing 
inequality; namely, social protection, education, health, and housing expenditure. As in case of 
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taxes, expenditures are too expressed as a percentage of GDP. These four types of expenditure 
have functions that target households and individuals in order to improve their welfare. The logic 
is that the higher the ratio of GDP that is dedicated to these different types of expenditures, the 
more likely income distribution will improve. This will be so in terms of market income (gross 
and net) for higher expenditures on human capital creation services such as health and education 
and on social welfare expenditures having to do with income protection and maintenance 
programs. In the case of other public expenditures, such as housing, they may also have a 
positive impact on equality, especially when this is measured in terms of the distribution of 
consumption.  
 
It is very likely that within each of these aggregate categories of spending, incidence of 
subcategories would vary, so it would be ideal to observe more disaggregated categories of 
public spending. Ideally, the data should identify under social protection those programs that 
have the highest impact on inequality, such as cash transfers programs to the unemployed or 
elderly as well as income tax credits or transfers to low income households. Unfortunately, at 
this point data with such level of disaggregation does not exist at the international level. 
Similarly, it would be very desirable to have disaggregated information on expenditures on 
education and health. While spending on tertiary or college education tends to be regressive 
spending in primary education, especially in rural areas tends to much more progressive; 
similarly spending on primary health programs is generally expected to be much more 
progressive than spending on hospitalization programs. But again, unfortunately, internationally 
comparable disaggregated data on these forms of public spending are not available. For our 
analysis, therefore we are forced to employ the aggregate categories of expenditures measured as 
percent of GDP. Even though these variables are subject to observation error-induced by the 
level of aggregation--, we are hopeful they still can tell an interesting story. We anticipate all 
four types of expenditures to have a positive effect on income equality.   
 
Control Variables  
To avoid specification biases in our estimates of the impact of tax and spending patterns on 
income inequality it is important that in the regressions we account for the relevant economic 
and social determinants of income distribution consistently found in the previous literature on 
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income distribution (see Milanovic, 2006; De Gregorio and Lee, 2002; Gupta, Davoodi, & 
Alonso-Terme, 2002).  These control variables generally consider changes in labor supply, labor 
demand, and an assortment of institutional changes. For example depending on how welfare and 
social security programs work, they may adapt to reduce inequalities as the level of 
unemployment increases, although not enough to offset the decrease in market income for the 
unemployed. Factors affecting labor supply include population size, age structure, and education 
attainment. On the labor demand size, important factors include technological change, 
international trade and outsourcing. Finally, the quality of institutions is very important because 
it affects the impact of changes in the labor market. For example, high political corruption allows 
certain interest groups to influence policy-makers to implement policies that do not necessarily 
benefit low-income groups. In addition, the size of government also matters. Larger governments 
may be more able to meet the demands of low-income households and individuals through 
different social programs. More specifically, the control variables we include in the regressions 
are described in the following paragraphs.  
 
The population growth rate is expected to have positive effect on income inequality as faster 
growing societies experience faster growing demand for public services and increased 
difficulties of governments to provide those services; at the same time market earnings are 
expected to be more diverse. Moreover, faster growing population likely leads to an increase in 
the ratio of profits and rents to labor earnings. Since income from profits and rents is less equally 
distributed than labor income (Kuznets, 1963), faster growing population may lead to less 
equally distributed income (Boulier, 1975).  
 
Income distribution in a country also depends on the age structure. To capture this dimension, 
previous works on income inequality commonly use two demographic variables: the youth 
dependency ratio (defined as the ratio of the number of persons ages 0–15 to the number of 
persons ages 16–64) and the old-age dependency ratio (defined as the ratio of persons ages 65 or 
over to the number of persons ages 16–64). Higher youth dependency is expected to likely result 
in higher income inequality, mainly because higher youth dependency suggests higher average 
number of children per household and lower household per capita income. On the other hand, 
larger share of elderly in population is expected to be associated with relatively lower income 
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inequality. Literature suggests that the effect of old-age dependency ratio on income inequality 
basically depends on the design of the pension system. In a case when there is no government 
program, higher ratio of elderly to working population raises income inequality, while in 
presence of a redistributive tax-transfer scheme and state pensions, aging population decreases 
inequality (Von Weizsacker, 1989). Having in mind that in most countries elderly represent 
significant group of voters, it is likely that politicians, whose objective is maximizing number of 
votes, would implement government programs that would benefit elderly, resulting in lower 
income inequality.   
 
Another important component of income inequality is level of education of individuals. There is 
a large literature on the effect of education on income inequality which can be divided into two 
groups; namely, on the one side are studies that find that more unequal education distribution 
implies more income inequality (the so-called “composition” effect), and on the other side are 
studies that find that a higher average education level leads to less income inequality (the 
“compression” effect) (Knight & Sabot, 1983). In order to account for this effect, we include a 
variable measuring the average number of years of schooling in country   in year  . Higher level 
of education is assumed to increase disposable income to households and individuals, and 
potentially reduce income inequality.  
 
Similarly, higher unemployment rate is associated with many economic changes that have 
important consequences for income distribution. Literature suggests that higher unemployments 
increases inequality of income and welfare because unemployment risks are higher among low-
income earners (Bjorklung, 1991). Unemployment reduces the ability of people to earn income 
and achieve standard of living, potentially leading to higher income inequality. On the other 
hand, economic development measured by GDP per capita growth rate implies higher 
disposable income per capita and per household, and may be associated with lower income 
inequality, although this is not necessarily the case because different inequality patterns can hide 
behind the same GDP per capita growth ratios .  
 
We also introduce two institutional variables. First, there has been an intense debate in recent 
years about the effect of globalization on the distribution of income. Studies like WEO (2007) 
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find that globalization has been one of the factors that have negatively affected labor income in 
advanced economies therefore becoming an important factor behind increased inequality. In 
order to capture this dimension of income inequality, we use the KOF index of globalization 
(Dreher, 2006; updated Dreher, Noel, and Martens, 2008), which takes values between zero and 
hundred (higher values denote greater globalization). The globalization index takes into account 
actual economic flows (e.g. trade, stock of FDI), economic restrictions (e.g. import barriers, tariff 
rates), data on information flows (e.g. internet users, trade in newspapers), data on personal 
contact (e.g. telephone traffic, international tourism), and data on cultural proximity.  
 
Second, in order to control for the quality of overall governance and efficiency of the public 
sector we control for the level of corruption. There have not been many studies on the impact of 
corruption on income inequality. Those few papers that do investigate this relationship find that 
corruption increases income inequality, mostly by reducing economic growth (Gupta et al. 
2002). We can also reasonably assume that high levels of corruption are correlated with tax 
evasion, which is more likely to make the true distribution of income more unequal (as in 
Duncan and Sabirianova Peter, 2008) We measure corruption with the ICRG’s assessment of 
corruption within the political system and it is expected to lead to increased inequality because 
such corruption distorts the economic and financial environment and affects people’s ability to 
earn income and achieve reasonable standards of living. Finally, we control for the size of 
government as a proxy for the ability of governments to respond to the demands of lower income 
households and individuals.  
 
By looking at the impact of all taxes (and not only personal income taxes and social 
contributions as in Immervoll and Richardson, 2011) and many different categories of 
expenditures (and not just direct cash transfers to the non elderly as for example in Immervoll 
and Richardson (2011)), the scope of this study goes beyond what has been done in the previous 
literature. But what we gain in completeness by looking at all taxes and several expenditures, we 
lose in detail for being able to identify for example individual cash transfer programs.   
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6. Empirical Findings 
 
As mentioned above, our empirical analysis consists of three parts. In the first part we focus our 
analysis only on the tax structure and its effect on income inequality. In the second part our 
interest is to investigate distributional effect of different types of public expenditures. Finally, in 
the third part we combine both tax instruments and types of public spending and evaluate their 
joint effect on income inequality. 
 
Taxation and Income Inequality 
Table 1 below presents the results obtained from estimating model (1) when only tax variables 
are included in the analysis along with the other control variables. Column (1) presents the 
benchmark results obtained by including only control variables. Most of the control variables are 
statistically significant and have the predicted sign as discussed above. First, our results provide 
support to the hypothesis that demographic changes affect income inequality. Faster growing 
countries, as expected, seem to experience larger income inequality, which corresponds to the 
findings in the literature. However, we do not limit our analysis only on observing population 
growth, but also other aspects of population dynamics. More precisely, we consider the effect of 
age structure in terms of young- and old-age dependency ratios and provide some support to the 
hypothesis that these two groups of dependent population have the opposite effect on income 
inequality. Furthermore, as suggested by the large literature on education and income inequality, 
higher average education level implies more equal income distribution. Similarly, we provide 
support to the hypothesis that a higher unemployment rate increases inequality in income 
distribution. Furthermore, our results on the effect of globalization and corruption are consistent 
with findings from the literature which suggests that higher globalization and corruption increase 
income inequality. Finally, we find that countries with larger governments have more equal 
income distribution, due to their ability to respond better to the needs of the population. Columns 
(2)-(7) of Table 1 present the results obtained by individually including each alternative tax 
instruments in equation (1).  
 
As the results in column (2) suggest, PIT has the expected positive effect on income inequality, 
and this effect increases with more progressive tax structure, even though the economic effect is 
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not very large. For example, with zero progressivity of PIT, one percentage point increase in the 
share of PIT to GDP results in a 0.1 percentage point reduction in income inequality. In addition, 
one percentage point increase in PIT progressivity increases the negative effect of PIT on income 
inequality by 0.005 percentage points.  
 
Column (3) presents the results obtained by focusing only on the effect of CIT on income 
inequality.  
Theory on the incidence of social security contributions and payroll taxes suggests that imposing 
these types of taxes results in a combination of lower real wages and higher unemployment rates. 
While these taxes are commonly levied equally between employers and employees, there is a 
broad consensus among economists that they are mostly shifted to employees in form of low 
wages, ultimately resulting in increased income inequality. Results on column 4 in Table 1 
provide support to this hypothesis – an increase of one percentage point in the share of social 
security taxes leads to an increase in income inequality by 0.7 percentage points.  
 
The common perception regarding the general sales tax-- GST (or VAT)-- is that is regressive 
because poorer households spend a greater share of their income on consumption, so they are 
likely to pay higher average tax relative to the higher income households. However, not much 
empirical work has been done so far testing this general conjecture. The results obtained in 
column 5 of Table 1 provide support to that hypothesis. Our results suggest that an increase of 
one percentage point in the share of GST in GDP increases income inequality by around 0.5 
percentage points. As we have commented above, all other types of indirect taxes, excises and 
customs duties may be regressive. Our results in columns 6 and 7 provide only weak support to 
this hypothesis with estimated coefficient being positive but not statistically significant, probably 
reflecting the composition of such taxes. 
 
Finally, in column 8 of Table 1 we present the results obtained by estimating model (1) when all 
tax instruments are included, but still without taking into account public spending. Most of the 
estimated coefficients keep their expected sign, but some of them lose statistical significance, 
which may be explained by a significant reduction of the sample size when all tax instruments 
are included (sample size reduces by 32 percent when all tax instruments are included). In 
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particular, the estimated coefficient CIT and the interaction term of CIT and globalization remain 
statistically significant. The estimated coefficients for PIT and the interaction term of PIT and 
PIT progressivity are also jointly significant at 5 percent significance level. Moreover, all tax 
variables are jointly significant at 1 percent significance level. 
 
In summary, the results in Table 1 show --as far as we know for the first time in the literature--, 
in a rich multi-country panel context the validation of most of the conventional conclusions on 
the final economic incidence of different taxes, which typically have been applied and tested in 
the context of static country-case studies.
22
    
 
 
                                                          
22
 As we have seen some recent papers, such as Duncan and Sabirianova Peter (2008) have examined the impact of a 
one single tax, the PIT. Our results for progressivity are similar to those they obtain. However, in our regressions we 
anchor the progressivity index with the relative importance of PIT collections in GDP while Duncan and 
Sabirianova Peter (2008) do not. But clearly the ability of a highly progressive PIT to redistribute income depends 
also on the size of its collections relative to GDP.   
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Table1. Taxation and Income Inequality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Gini-1 -0.061* 0.019*** -0.069*** 0.048 0.009 -0.156*** -0.066* 0.110*** 
 (0.033) (0.005) (0.010) (0.051) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.015) 
Net 5.164*** 5.281*** 4.893*** -0.810 4.608*** 5.170*** 4.762*** 2.173 
 (1.010) (0.509) (0.292) (4.261) (0.937) (1.103) (1.396) (2.273) 
Gross 5.424*** 5.593*** 4.179*** 0.300 4.824*** 6.091*** 5.159*** 3.290 
 (1.236) (0.508) (0.343) (3.799) (1.179) (1.469) (1.677) (2.409) 
Pop. growth 0.593*** 0.479*** 0.113 0.338 0.486** 0.126 0.473** 0.124 
 (0.203) (0.126) (0.205) (0.259) (0.192) (0.290) (0.192) (0.316) 
Age Dep. Youth 0.122*** -0.040** -0.078*** 0.105** 0.127*** 0.159** 0.190*** -0.074 
 (0.041) (0.020) (0.017) (0.044) (0.044) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) 
Age Dep. Elderly -0.498*** -0.028 -0.272** -0.621*** -0.404*** -0.363*** -0.706*** -0.102 
 (0.128) (0.079) (0.138) (0.178) (0.124) (0.140) (0.138) (0.160) 
Education -0.787*** -0.390*** -0.244*** -0.559*** -0.782*** -0.462** -0.428** -1.139*** 
 (0.159) (0.077) (0.049) (0.201) (0.222) (0.208) (0.205) (0.222) 
Unemployment 0.133*** 0.153*** 0.098*** 0.105*** 0.139*** 0.147*** 0.130*** 0.121* 
 (0.020) (0.007) (0.019) (0.031) (0.028) (0.027) (0.022) (0.066) 
GDP pc growth 0.011 -0.009** -0.008 0.021 0.011 0.010 0.016 -0.042** 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.014) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.018) 
Globalization 0.113*** 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.080*** 0.106*** 0.069*** 0.089*** 0.035 
 (0.017) (0.011) (0.022) (0.024) (0.015) (0.021) (0.019) (0.028) 
Corruption 0.203*** 0.173*** 0.337*** 0.274*** 0.233*** 0.326*** 0.211*** 0.009 
 (0.064) (0.057) (0.031) (0.064) (0.067) (0.081) (0.074) (0.194) 
Total Revenues -0.020 -0.027*** 0.005 -0.069* -0.059*** 0.019 -0.006  
 (0.021) (0.007) (0.023) (0.036) (0.022) (0.023) (0.020)  
PIT  -0.094**      -0.105 
  (0.043)      (0.098) 
PIT*Progressivity  -0.005***      -0.004 
  (0.001)      (0.003) 
CIT   -0.703***     -0.925** 
   (0.109)     (0.397) 
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Table1. Taxation and Income Inequality (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
CIT*Globalization   0.009***     0.013** 
   (0.002)     (0.006) 
SSC+Payroll    0.720***    0.234 
    (0.168)    (0.168) 
GST     0.485***   0.314 
     (0.154)   (0.343) 
Excise      0.258  0.988*** 
      (0.195)  (0.301) 
Customs       0.130 -0.497 
       (0.178) (0.393) 
Constant 31.400*** 30.658*** 38.326*** 39.337*** 32.397*** 35.120*** 30.118*** 35.716*** 
 (3.503) (1.848) (1.917) (5.696) (3.994) (4.698) (4.372) (3.720) 
Observations 936 713 834 873 908 834 871 634 
Number of id 79 69 75 74 78 71 75 56 
Sargan 42.92 58.41 66.80 37.12 35.21 35.74 39.58 37.69 
AR2 0.866 0.857 0.727 0.950 0.798 0.960 0.992 1.153 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Public Spending and Income Inequality 
We turn now to the results obtained on the effect of public spending on income inequality. As we 
already explained above, we focus on four types of social spending; namely, social protection 
expenditures, expenditures on education, health, and housing. As in case of taxation, here also 
we first estimate the model (1) by introducing separately types of expenditures, and then we 
estimate the model by including all four expenditure categories. It is important to point out that 
internationally comparable data on functional classification of expenditures is very scarce, which 
has an effect on our results, especially when all expenditure categories are included in the model. 
Including only social protection expenditures in the model results in a reduction of sample size 
by 35 percent. Column 2 in Table 2 shows the results obtained by estimating this regression. Our 
results suggest that one percentage point increase in expenditures for social protection reduces 
income inequality by 0.14 percentage points. Similar effect is estimated for expenditures on 
education in column 3. Estimated effects of expenditures on health and household are a bit 
higher – one percentage point in these two types of expenditures leads to a reduction in income 
inequality by between 0.7 and 0.8 percentage points. Finally, when all four expenditure 
components are included in the model, all but education keep their expected sign, with only 
expenditure on health remaining statistically significant. This loss in significance could be very 
well contributed to a significant reduction (56 percent) in sample size. But note that all four 
categories of expenditures in column 6 of Table 2 are jointly significant at the 1 percent 
significance level. 
 
In summary, in spite of the high level of aggregation with which we measure the four categories 
of “redistributional expenditures” we find in agreement with the previous literature that, overall, 
they contribute to reduce income inequality. Also note that in general, as has been previously 
found in country-case studies, dollar per dollar fiscal tools in the expenditure side of the budget 
tend to be more effective than redistributive measures in the revenue side of the budget. For 
example, using personal income tax to redistribute income would result in lower reduction in 
income inequality than relying on any type observed social expenditures On the other hand, 
corporate income tax shows to be close to an equally effective tool of income inequality   
reduction as some forms of government spending. However, using heavily corporate income tax 
as a tool of income redistribution has a drawback because as soon as capital is able to leave the 
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country and avoid taxation, the burden of corporate income tax falls on labor leading to the 
opposite than planned effect of such a policy.  
 
A third option would be to reduce taxation on consumption. However, consumption taxes 
constitute a very important component of government revenues, especially in developing 
countries where the formal tax base is not well established and using indirect taxes is very 
important for collecting sufficient amount of government revenues. On the other hand, using any 
type of observed social expenditures shows to be effective in the reduction of income inequality. 
For example revenue neutral combination of one percentage point increase in the collection of 
general sales tax to GDP and equal increase in housing expenditures would result in a reduction 
of income inequality of 0.3 percentage points. 
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Table2. Expenditures and Income Inequality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gini-1 -0.061* -0.066*** -0.152*** -0.088*** -0.197*** -0.097** 
 (0.033) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.016) (0.040) 
Net 5.164*** 5.748*** 4.672*** 5.140*** 5.379*** 5.951*** 
 (1.010) (1.189) (0.524) (0.395) (0.394) (1.224) 
Gross 5.424*** 4.783*** 2.987*** 3.762*** 3.977*** 3.499* 
 (1.236) (1.219) (0.833) (0.687) (0.496) (1.951) 
Pop. growth 0.593*** 0.726*** 0.239*** 0.334*** 1.160*** 1.489*** 
 (0.203) (0.254) (0.091) (0.074) (0.254) (0.554) 
Age Dep. Youth 0.122*** -0.046*** -0.076*** -0.009 0.184*** 0.203** 
 (0.041) (0.018) (0.027) (0.015) (0.025) (0.086) 
Age Dep. Elderly -0.498*** -0.118 -0.315*** -0.257*** -0.324 -0.449** 
 (0.128) (0.110) (0.070) (0.066) (0.217) (0.192) 
Education -0.787*** 0.027 -0.014 -0.167** -0.417*** -0.142 
 (0.159) (0.047) (0.078) (0.069) (0.093) (0.191) 
Unemployment 0.133*** 0.119*** 0.097*** 0.062*** 0.112*** 0.188*** 
 (0.020) (0.013) (0.011) (0.007) (0.012) (0.032) 
GDP pc growth 0.011 -0.007* 0.003 -0.022*** -0.006 0.008 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) 
Globalization 0.113*** 0.090*** 0.120*** 0.164*** 0.260*** 0.213*** 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.016) (0.023) 
Corruption 0.203*** 0.415*** 0.392*** 0.369*** 0.169*** 0.163 
 (0.064) (0.030) (0.029) (0.015) (0.027) (0.134) 
Total Revenues -0.020 -0.063*** -0.085*** -0.040*** -0.002  
 (0.021) (0.017) (0.016) (0.007) (0.013)  
Social 
Protection 
 -0.139***    -0.123 
  (0.038)    (0.097) 
Education   -0.134**   0.038 
   (0.058)   (0.175) 
Health    -0.695***  -0.415* 
    (0.030)  (0.230) 
Housing     -0.768*** -0.139 
     (0.068) (0.168) 
Constant 31.400*** 33.828*** 42.334*** 35.543*** 24.468*** 21.441** 
 (3.503) (1.923) (1.755) (1.525) (4.247) (9.714) 
Observations 936 604 643 694 503 410 
Number of id 79 65 67 72 61 54 
Sargan 42.92 51.23 55.81 55.92 48.34 41.62 
AR2 0.866 0.988 0.746 0.816 0.650 1.071 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Taxation and Public Spending and Income Inequality 
Finally, table 3 presents results obtained by including all tax and expenditures categories in the 
sample. Dues to a significant reduction in sample size (68 percent) due to missing values, most 
of variables in the model lose their statistical significance. Among tax instruments, only PIT and 
excise taxes keep their expected signs, with this latter being statistically significant only at the 10 
percent level. On the expenditure side, estimated coefficients on expenditures on social 
protection and health keep their negative signs, but only social protection expenditures is 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The lack of degrees of freedom and the generally 
weak results in Table 3 prevent us from examining the question of whether fiscal redistribution 
tools on the revenue and expenditure sides of the budget tend to work as complements or 
substitutes, although the weak results point toward complementarity. This is a question that 
awaits a more complete panel data set.   
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Table3. Taxation, Expenditures and Income Inequality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Gini-1 -0.061* 0.110*** -0.097** -0.026 
 (0.033) (0.015) (0.040) (0.044) 
Net 5.164*** 2.173 5.951*** 10.902*** 
 (1.010) (2.273) (1.224) (3.780) 
Gross 5.424*** 3.290 3.499* 10.429** 
 (1.236) (2.409) (1.951) (4.419) 
Pop. growth 0.593*** 0.124 1.489*** 3.098*** 
 (0.203) (0.316) (0.554) (1.087) 
Age Dep. Youth 0.122*** -0.074 0.203** -0.347 
 (0.041) (0.062) (0.086) (0.423) 
Age Dep. Elderly -0.498*** -0.102 -0.449** 0.169 
 (0.128) (0.160) (0.192) (1.021) 
Education -0.787*** -1.139*** -0.142 -0.295 
 (0.159) (0.222) (0.191) (0.550) 
Unemployment 0.133*** 0.121* 0.188*** 0.173 
 (0.020) (0.066) (0.032) (0.141) 
GDP pc growth 0.011 -0.042** 0.008 -0.070 
 (0.009) (0.018) (0.008) (0.052) 
Globalization 0.113*** 0.035 0.213*** 0.224 
 (0.017) (0.028) (0.023) (0.217) 
Corruption 0.203*** 0.009 0.163 0.264 
 (0.064) (0.194) (0.134) (0.826) 
PIT  -0.105  -0.176 
  (0.098)  (0.690) 
PIT*Progressivity  -0.004  -0.013 
  (0.003)  (0.021) 
CIT  -0.925**  4.638 
  (0.397)  (5.703) 
CIT*Globalization  0.013**  -0.065 
  (0.006)  (0.074) 
SSC+Payroll  0.234  -0.300 
  (0.168)  (0.373) 
GST  0.314  -0.260 
  (0.343)  (0.394) 
Excise  0.988***  3.148** 
  (0.301)  (1.323) 
Customs  -0.497  -0.762 
  (0.393)  (1.592) 
Social Protection   -0.123 -0.366* 
   (0.097) (0.210) 
Education   0.038 0.506 
   (0.175) (0.581) 
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Table3. Taxation, Expenditures and Income Inequality (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Health   -0.415* -0.664 
   (0.230) (0.528) 
Housing   -0.139 0.620 
   (0.168) (0.883) 
Constant 31.400*** 35.716*** 21.441** 17.770 
 (3.503) (3.720) (9.714) (42.834) 
Observations 936 634 410 298 
Number of id 79 56 54 42 
Sargan 42.92 37.69 41.62 19.91 
AR2 0.866 1.153 1.071 0.929 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
7. Conclusion  
In this paper we have examined the impact of taxes and some types of public expenditures on 
income distribution using a large panel data set of 150 countries over a period of over a quarter 
century (1970-2006). In our empirical analysis, we find significant effects of both taxes and 
public spending on the Gini coefficient. On the taxation side, our results generally support the 
findings in previous individual country incidence analysis studies. Progressive personal income 
taxes have a positive impact on income distribution, contributing to decreasing inequality, and 
this effect is more pronounced the higher the degree of progressivity and the higher the share of 
GDP that is collected with the individual income taxes. Corporate income taxes also have a 
positive effect on income distribution but this effect is eroded away with the degree of 
globalization or openness. General consumption taxes, excise taxes, and customs duties have a 
negative impact on income distribution. On the expenditure side, we find that higher shares of 
GDP on social welfare, education, health, and housing public expenditures have a positive 
impact on income distribution, individually and collectively.  
 
In terms of the magnitude of the impact of these fiscal policy instruments, both taxes and 
expenditures, on income distribution, it is estimated as a combination of the estimated marginal 
effects of each fiscal instrument and the actual change in policy in the use of that fiscal 
instrument. Thus, even though a particular instrument may be relatively ineffective—having a 
relatively small marginal impact—this may be more than offset by a large change in the use of 
 The Impact of Tax and Expenditure Policies on Income Distribution 39 
   
 
 
 
that instrument, and vice versa. Table 4 summarizes the final effects for each  fiscal instrument  
taking into account our best estimates of the marginal effects (in Tables 1 and 2) and allowing a 
change in the usage of the instruments that is equal to the overall change between 1990 and 
2005. The results are clearly general averages for a large number of countries and for a long 
period of time. However, we believe they are good summary indicators of the overall effects of 
fiscal policies on income distribution trends worldwide.  
 
Table 4. Economic Effect of Tax and Expenditure Policy 
Policy Instrument 
Estimated 
Marginal Effect 
Increase (+)/Reduction(-) 
between 1990 and 2005 
(percentage points) 
Resulting increase 
(+)/reduction(-) in 
income inequality, 
ceteris paribus 
(percentage points) 
Personal Income Tax -0.09 -0.61 
0.04 Personal Income Tax 
* Progressivity -0.01 1.76 
Corporate Income Tax -0.70 0.24 
-0.13 Corporate Income Tax 
* Globalization  0.01 3.84 
Social Security and 
Payroll Taxes 0.72 0.98 
0.70 
Taxes on Goods and 
Services 0.49 2.10 
1.03 
Excises 0.26 -0.09 -0.02 
Customs Duties 0.13 -0.66 -0.09 
Total  Effect of 
Taxes 
  
1.53 
   
 
Social Protection 
Expenditures -0.14 1.57 
-0.22 
Education 
Expenditures -0.13 -0.86 
0.12 
Health Expenditures -0.70 2.11 -1.46 
Housing Expenditures -0.77 -0.78 0.60 
Total Effect of 
Expenditures 
  
-0.97 
Note: All instruments expressed as % of GDP 
 
 
Despite the fact that personal income taxes are progressive, the significant decreases in personal 
income tax collections as % of GDP accompanied by the overall reduction in the index of 
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progressivity of these taxes led to a relatively minor increase in overall income inequality of 0.04 
in the Gini coefficient.  
 
On the other hand, corporate income taxes, which also result as being generally progressive, 
increased in size and, despite the increase in overall globalization –which tends to decrease the 
progressivity of this tax—, the overall result was a contribution to reducing income inequality by 
0.13 of the Gini coefficient.  
 
The significant increases in the sizes of social security contributions and payroll taxes, and 
general consumption taxes—both being generally regressive-- led to much larger increases in 
income inequality, of 0.70 and 1.03 of the Gini coefficient, respectively.  
 
For excises and customs duties—both also generally regressive—their decrease in size as share 
of GDP from 1990 to 2005 led to decreases in income inequality of 0.02 and 0.09 of the Gini 
coefficient, respectively.  
 
On the expenditure side, the four categories of public expenditures considered, social protection, 
education, health, and housing, appear all as being progressive but their impact has been 
different depending on how their share if GDP has changed over the 1990-2005 period. The 
increases in social protection expenditures led to a reduction of the Gini of 0.22 and the increases 
in public health expenditures also led to a decrease in inequality, in this case significantly larger 
of 1.46 of the Gini. The reductions in public expenditures in education and housing shares led to 
increases in inequality of 0.12 and 0.60 of the Gini, respectively.      
 
From a policy perspective, we can observe that taxes and public expenditures policies cannot be 
identified as strictly substitute or complementary instruments toward redistribution goals.
23
 For 
both taxes and expenditures the use of instruments was mixed; some contributed to decreasing 
inequality and some had the opposite effect.  
 
                                                          
23
 This question has been addressed by Bahl et al. (2002) at the state level in the United States. 
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Similarly, our results would not lead us to conclude that expenditure policies have been more 
effective overall than taxes in affecting income distribution, although this result needs to be 
interpreted with caution because only a few public spending categories have been selected. And 
finally, also from the perspective of a policy maker, it is clear that the overall impact of fiscal 
policy as a whole has been quite limited. Over the 1990-2005 period, the net effect of tax 
policies was to increase inequality by 1.53 of the Gini while the impact of expenditure policies 
was to decrease inequality by 0.97 of the Gini.   
 
Of course, we must be mindful that income redistribution is not the only objective of fiscal 
policy design. Besides collecting revenues, tax and expenditure policies  have an impact on 
macroeconomic stability as well as the efficient allocation of resources and economic growth.  
Even beyond that, in a globalize world, fiscal policy affects the overall competitiveness of a 
country, attracting or discouraging foreign investors.  However, based on our results, its potential 
to drastically affect the Gini coefficient and change income distribution patterns should not be 
overestimated. 
4th ITD  
 
 
  
42    International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
 
 
References 
 
Adam, S. and J. Browne (2010), “Redistribution, Work Incentives and Thirty Years of UK Tax 
and Benefit Reform”, IFS Working Paper No. 10/24, Institute for Fiscal Studies, London. 
Afonso, A., Ebert, W., Schuknecht, L., & Thone, M. (2005). Quality of public finances and 
growth. European Central Bank, Working Paper Series: 438. 
Alfranca, O., & Galindo, M.-A. (2003). Public Expenditure, Income Distribution, and Growth in 
OECD Countries. International Advances in Economic Research, 9(2), 133-139. 
Anand, S., & Kanbur, S. M. R. (1993). The Kuznets Process and the Inequality-Development 
Relatioship. Journal of Development Economics, 40, 25-52. 
Angelopoulos, K., Philippopoulos, A., & Tsionas, E. (2008). Does Public Sector Efficiency 
Matter? Revisiting the Relation between Fiscal Size and Economic Growth in a World 
Sample. Public Choice, 137(1-2), 245-278. 
Araujo, M. C., Ferreira, F. H. G., Lanjouw, P., & Ozler, B. (2008). Local Inequality and Project 
Choice: Theory and Evidence from Ecuador. Journal of Public Economics, 92(5-6), 
1022-1046. 
Arellano, M., and Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo 
evidence and an application to employment equations. The Review of Economic Studies, 
58(2), 277-297. 
Arellano, M., and Bover, O. (1995). Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of 
error-components models. Journal of Econometrics, 68(1), 29-51. 
Baer, W., & Galvao, A. F., Jr. (2008). Tax Burden, Government Expenditures and Income 
Distribution in Brazil. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 48(2), 345-358. 
Bahl, Roy and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Sally Wallace. 2002. State and Local Government 
Choices in Fiscal Redistribution. National Tax Journal 60(4) 723-742. 
Bayraktar, N., & Moreno-Dodson, B. (2010). How can public spending help you grow ? an 
empirical analysis for developing countries. The World Bank, Policy Research Working 
Paper Series: 5367. 
Bird, R.M., & Zolt, E.M. (2005). Redistribution via Taxation: The Limited Role of the Personal 
Income Tax in Developing Countries. UCLA Law Review 52(6), 1627-95 
Bjorklund, A. (1991). Unemployment and Income Distribution: Time-Series Evidence from 
Sweden. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 93(3), 457. 
Blundell, R., and Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel 
data models. Journal of econometrics, 87(1), 115-143. 
Borge, L.-E., & Rattso, J. (2004). Income distribution and tax structure: Empirical test of the 
Meltzer–Richard hypothesis. European Economic Review 48, 805-826. 
Boulier, B. (1975). The effects of demographic variables on income distribution. Woodrow 
Wilson School Discussion Paper No. 6. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University. 
Boustan, L. P., Ferreira, F., Winkler, H., & Zolt, E. (2010). Income Inequality and Local 
Government in the United States, 1970-2000. National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Inc, NBER Working Papers: 16299. 
Caminada, K., & Goudswaard, K. (2001). International Trends in Income Inequality and Social 
Policy. International Tax and Public Finance, 8(4), 395-415. 
Campiglio, L. (1990). Income Distribution, Public Expenditure and Equality. Labour, 4(1), 97-
124. 
 The Impact of Tax and Expenditure Policies on Income Distribution 43 
   
 
 
 
Chen, B.-L. (2006). Economic Growth with an Optimal Public Spending Composition. Oxford 
Economic Papers, 58(1), 123-136. 
Clarke, G. R. G. (1992). More Evidence on Income Distribution and Growth, Policy Research 
Working Paper 1064. Washington DC: The World Bank. 
Clements, B. (1997). Income Distribution and Social Expenditure in Brazil. International 
Monetary Fund, IMF Working Papers: 97/120. 
Day, R. H., & Yang, C. (2011). Economic Growth and the Effects of Fiscal Policy. 
Metroeconomica, 62(1), 218-234. 
De Mello, L., & Tiongson, E. (2006). Income Inequality and Redistributive Government 
Spending. Public Finance Review, 34(3), 282-305. 
Dollar, D., & Kraay, A. (2002). Growth is Good for the Poor. Journal of Economic Growth, 7(3), 
195-225. 
Dreher, Axel (2006): Does Globalization Affect Growth? Evidence from a new Index of 
Globalization, Applied Economics 38, 10: 1091-1110. 
Dreher, Axel, Noel Gaston and Pim Martens (2008), Measuring Globalisation – Gauging its 
Consequences (New York: Springer).  
Duncan, D. and K. Sabirianova Peter. (2008). “Tax Progressivity and Income Inequality.” 
Georgia State University Andrew Young School of Policy Studies Working Paper 08-26. 
Glennerster, H., (2006), “Tibor Barna: The redistributive impact of taxes and social policies in 
the UK: 1937-2005”, CASE LSE STICERD Research Paper No. CASE115, London 
School of Economics. 
Gravelle, J. (1992) Journal of Economic Perspectives 
Gregorio, J. D., & Lee, J. (2002). Education and Income Inequality: New Evidence From Cross-
Country Data. Review of Income & Wealth, 48(3), 395-416. 
Gupta, S., Davoodi, H., & Rosa Alonso-Terme (2002). “Does Corruption Affect Income 
inequality and Poverty?” Economics of Governance 3: 23-45. 
Guran, M. C., & Tosun, M. U. (2008). A Cross-Country Analysis of Public Sector Interventions' 
Efficiency. Ekonomicky Casopis/Journal of Economics, 56(2), 182-211. 
Harberger, A. C. (1995). The ABCs of Corporation Tax Incidence: Insights into the Open 
Economy Case. Tax Policy and Economic Growth, Washington D.C.: American Council 
for Capital Formation. 
Harberger, A. C. 1962. “The Incidence of the Corporate Income Tax.” Journal of Political 
Economy 70: 215-240. June.   
Harberger, A.C. (1998). “A Vision of the Growth process,” The American Economic Review, 
88(1): 1-32. 
Harberger, A.C. (2006). Taxation and Income Distribution: Myths and Realities. In J. Alm, J. 
Martinez-Vazquez and M. Rider, eds., The Challenges of Tax Reform in a Global 
Economy (New York: Springer) 
Herrera, S. (2007). Public expenditure and growth. The World Bank, Policy Research Working 
Paper Series: 4372. 
Holtz-Eakin, D., Newey, W., and Rosen, H. (1988). Estimating vector autoregressions with panel 
data. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 56(6), 1371-1395. 
Immervoll, H. and L. Richardson. (2011). Redistribution Policy and Inequality Reduction in 
OECD Countries: What Has Changed in Two Decades? Institute for the Study of Labor 
IZA Dicussion Paper No. 6030.(October) 
44    International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
 
 
Immervoll, H., Levy, H., C. Lietz, D. Mantovani, C. O., Donoghue, H. Sutherland & Verbist, G. 
(2006), “Household Incomes and Redistribution in the European Union: Quantifying the 
Equalising Properties of Taxes and Benefits”, in: D B Papadimitriou (ed.), The 
Distributional Effects of Government Spending and Taxation, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Jao, C.-C. (2000). The Impact of Tax Revenue and Social Welfare Expenditure on Income 
Distribution in Taiwan. Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 5(1-2), 73-90. 
Keuning, S., & Thorbecke, E. (1989). The Impact of Budget Retrenchment on Income 
Distribution in Indonesia (including Statistical Annex): A Social Accounting Matrix 
Application. OECD Development Centre, OECD Development Centre Working Papers: 
3. 
Khemani, S. (2010). Political economy of infrastructure spending in India. The World Bank, 
Policy Research Working Paper Series: 5423. 
Knight, J. B., & Sabot, R. H. (1983). Educational Expansion and the Kuznets Effect. American 
Economic Review 73(5), 1132–1136. 
Kuznets, S. (1955). Economic Growth and Income Inequality. The American Economic Review, 
45(1), 1-28. 
Li, W., & Sarte, P.-D. (2004). Progressive taxation and long-run growth. American Economic 
Review 94(5), 1705-1716. 
Martinez-Vazquez, J. (2008).The Impact of Budgets on the Poor: Tax and Expenditure Benefit 
Incidence Analysis", in Public Finance for Poverty Reduction, Blanca Moreno-Dodson  
and Quentin Wodon (eds.) World Bank. 
Milanovic, B. (2006). Global income inequality : what it is and why it matters. The World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper Series, WPS3865. 
Moreno-Dodson, B. (2008). Assessing the impact of public spending on growth - an empirical 
analysis for seven fast growing countries. The World Bank, Policy Research Working 
Paper Series: 4663. 
Meltzer, A. H., and S. F. Richard (1981). A Rational Theory of the Size of Government. The 
Journal of Political Economy 89(5), 914-927. 
Musgrave Richard and Tun Thin, 1948. Income Tax Progression, 1929-48. Journal of Political 
Economy 56(6): 498-514. 
Ocampo, J. A. (1998). Income Distribution, Poverty and Social Expenditure in Latin America. 
CEPAL Review (65), 7-14. 
Ozsoy, O. (2008). Government Budget Deficits, Defence Expenditure and Income Distribution: 
The Case of Turkey. Defence and Peace Economics, 19(1), 61-75. 
Paternostro, S., Rajaram, A., & Tiongson, E. R. (2007). How Does the Composition of Public 
Spending Matter? Oxford Development Studies, 35(1), 47-82. 
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini, 1999. “Political Economics and Public Finance,” NBER Working 
Paper, No. 7097. 
Peter, K. S., Buttrick, S., & Duncan, D. (2010). Global Reform of Personal Income Taxation, 
1981-2005: Evidence from 189 Countries. National Tax Journal, 6(3), 447-478. 
Riihelä, M., R. Sullström and I. Suoniemi (2008), “Tax progressivity and recent evolution of the 
Finnish income inequality”, VATT Discussion Paper No. 460, VATT Government 
Institute for Economic Research, Helsinki. 
Roodman, D. (2006). How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system GMM in 
Stata. Center for Global Development Working Paper Number 103. 
 The Impact of Tax and Expenditure Policies on Income Distribution 45 
   
 
 
 
Samanta, S. K., & Cerf, J. G. (2009). Income Distribution and the Effectiveness of Fiscal Policy: 
Evidence from Some Transitional Economies. East-West Journal of Economics and 
Business, 12(1), 29-45. 
Sawers, L., & Wachtel, H. M. (1975). Theory of the State, Government Tax and Purchasing 
Policy, and Income Distribution. Review of Income & Wealth, 21(1), 111-124. 
Schaltegger, C. A., & Torgler, B. (2006). Growth Effects of Public Expenditure on the State and 
Local Level: Evidence from a Sample of Rich Governments. Applied Economics, 38(10), 
1181-1192. 
Schuknecht, L., & Tanzi, V. (2005). Reforming public expenditure in industrialised countries - 
are there trade-offs? European Central Bank, Working Paper Series: 435. 
Schwartz, G., & Ter-Minassian, T. (2000). The Distributional Effects of Public Expenditure. 
Journal of Economic Surveys, 14(3), 337-358. 
Sepulveda, C., & Martinez-Vazquez, J. (2010). The Consequences of Fiscal Decentralization on 
Poverty and Income Inequality. International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of 
Policy Studies, Georgia State University, International Studies Program Working Paper 
Series, at AYSPS, GSU.  
Smeeding, T. M. (2004). Twenty Years of Research on Income Inequality, Poverty and 
Redistribution in the Developed World: Introduction and Overview". Socio-Economic 
Review, 2(149-163). 
Strulik, H. (2007). A Distributional Theory of Government Growth. Public Choice, 132(3-4), 
305-318. 
Tiongson, E. R., Rajaram, A., & Paternostro, S. (2005). How does the composition of public 
spending matter? The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper Series: 3555. 
Varoudakis, A., Tiongson, E. R., & Pushak, T. (2007). Public finance, governance, and growth in 
transition economies: empirical evidence from 1992-2004. The World Bank, Policy 
Research Working Paper Series: 4255. 
Von Weizsacker, R. K. (1989). Demographic change and income distribution. European 
Economic Review, 33(2-3), 377-388. 
Wagstaff A. and E. van Doorslaer, 2001, “What Makes the Personal Income Tax Progressive? A 
Comparative Analysis for Fifteen OECD Countries”, International Tax and Public 
Finance, 8(3), 299-316. 
Wagstaff A. and 24 other authors ,1999, “Redistributive effect, progressivity and differential tax 
treatment: Personal income taxes in twelve OECD countries”, Journal of Public 
Economics, 72, 73-98. 
Weller, C. E. (2007). The Benefits of Progressive Taxation in Economic Development. Review 
of Radical Political Economics 39(3) , 368-376. 
Zou, H.-f., Swaroop, V., & Devarajan, S. (1993). What do governments buy? The composition of 
public spending and economic performance. The World Bank, Policy Research Working 
Paper Series: 1082. 
 
 
